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LABOR LAW
PAUL H. SANDERS*

The body of statutory wording, regulations and court and administrative decisions which clusters around such familiar federal landmarks as the Labor-Management Relations Act ("Taft-Hartley")I and
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("Wage and Hour") 2 fall far short of
constituting the entire subject matter of Labor Law. State statutes or
the common law of the state may be much more in point in providing
the legal framework for solving a particular problem of the employment relationship, whether viewed individually or collectively. The
law which governs the various aspects of the "human factor in industry," or which prescribes the ground rules under which the parties
themselves govern these aspects, may require consideration, even in
a single case, of succeeding levels of legality extending from municipal
ordinances to the Constitution of the United States. 3 It continues to be
a problem of great difficulty to distinguish those situations where the
law of the state is applicable, even though some aspect of interstate
commerce is involved, and those where a federal statute has "occupied
the field."' 4 Even though federal law is controlling because Congress
has evidenced an intention to pre-empt the subject matter, the state
court is not necessarily prevented from applying that federal law in
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Regional Attorney, National War
Labor Board 1942-44; Regional Altorney, U.S. Department of Labor 1951-53.
1. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-97 (Supp. 1953).
2. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (Supp. 1952).
See Sanders, Basic Coverage of the Amended Federal Wage and Hour Law, 3
VA"D. L. REv. 175 (1950).

3. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed.
155 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939)..
4. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees
of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 Sup. Ct.
359, 95 L. Ed. 364 (1951); International Union, U.A.W.A., A.F. of L., Local 232
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93
L. Ed. 651 (1949); LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 18, 69 Sup. Ct. 379, 93 L. Ed. 463 (1949); Bethlehem Steel Co..
v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026, 91
L. Ed. 1234 (1947); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 65 Sup. Ct. 1373,.
89 L. Ed. 1782 (1945); Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 Sup. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 1154 (1942). Compare
Norris Grain Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1950), with Montgomery Building & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 256
Ala. 678, 57 So.2d 112 (1951), and Texas State Federation of Labor v. Brown
& Root, Inc., 246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See also Masetta v.
National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 107 N.E.2d 243 (Ohio App. 1952),. 5
STAN. L. REV. 358 (1953). See generally Cox and Seidman, Federalism and
Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REv. 211 (1950); Ratner, Problems of FederalState Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3 LABOR L.J. 750 (1952); Smith, The
Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations, 46 M1cH. L. Rxv_
593 (1948).
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deciding the case before it.5 It may 'be, however, that Congress has
not only written federal law on the subject but is considered to have
given exclusive jurisdiction over certain determinations under that law
to a particular federal agency. In such a situation, the doctrine of
"primary jurisdiction" ousts the state courts -and
federal courts,
f6o," the first instance -from making a similar determination. 6 The
"ffcisions of Tennessee appellate courts in the period under consideratfo' 'provide illustrations of some of these varying relationships bef ve~n federal and state labor law.
SUITS AGAINST NONRESIDENT UNIONS

it should go without saying, but it seems to bear repeating, that
mosf cases on labor disputes which go to court present a pathological
situation. They are no more representative of good labor relations than
the divorce cases are of good marriage relationships. The Supreme
Court of Tennessee and the several sections of the Court of Appeals
have not been faced in the last year with the problem. of determining
'theyalidity of objectives and methods in a current dispute between
'emiloyer and labor union. The nearest approach, perhaps, was in the
cas e of McDaniel v. Textile Worker's Union of America (CIO),7 which
grew out of a strike at the plant of the American Enka Company in
Hamblen County. An employee who had been shot crossing a picket
line brought an action for damages against the individuals firing shots,
the local union and the international organization. These facts do not
present a problem peculiar to labor relations, and hence, the decision
does not, strictly speaking, fall under the Labor Law heading. Assault,
battery and malicious mischief do not lose their ordinary legal significance in terms of civil or criminal consequences under the law of
the state merely because they occur on a picket line or in connection
with a strike.
.The trial judge sustained a plea of abatement on the part of the
international union challenging the validity of the 1947 statute which
in suits against out-of-state unincorporated associations, permits substituted service of process on the Secretary of State.8 A jury verdict
for damages was returned against the individual defendants and the
5. This is true, for example, as to employee suits under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, supra note 2. See the discussion of Todd v. Roane-Anderson Co.
n the section on Overtime Compensation of this article.
6. The basic case for the general doctrine is Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553 (1907). See also
Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 66 Sup. Ct. 937, 90 L. Ed. 1132
'(1946); cf. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324

U.S.

439, 65 Sup. Ct. 716, 89

L. Ed. 1051 (1945). See the discussion of Broome v. Louisville & N.R.R. in the
section on Railway Labor Suits in State Courts of this article. See generally
DAviS, ADmNISTRATVE LAW § 197 (1951).
7. 254 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1952), 6 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1953).

8. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 32, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8681.1-8681.3 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
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local union. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, afrnied
the judgment against the individual defendants and the local, union
but remanded the case for trial as to the defendant nternational labor
organization. The opinion by Judge McAmis held the statute providing
a mechanism for suit against an out-of-state unincorporated association
doing business within the State to be consistent with the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution.9 This overruling of previous decisions as to suits against unincorporated associations in other states
by substituted service of process on the Secretary of State has farreaching implications in many areas of the law. 10 It may be noted that
it will have particular significance in making it possible to reach in
damage suits out-of-state labor organizations which have had sufficient
"minimum contacts" within the State to come within the expanded
concept of procedural due process." The Court felt that the 1947
statute also had the effect of eliminating the objection that an unincorporated labor union is not a legal entity and may not be made
12
a party defendant.
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

In their internal affairs and relationships, labor organizations do
not fall under a body of law peculiarly applicable to them. Normally being unincorporated, such organizations are classed as one
type of the many voluntary, nonprofit associations, and legal pro13
cedures and relationships are determined and applied accordingly.
However, the hands-off attitude, which normally characterizes the
courts' dealings with internal affairs of such associations, has been
replaced increasingly in the case of labor unions by a more detailed
judicial and legislative regulation of many of such internal as9. Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), and Henry

L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed. 1097
(1935), are considered by Judge McAmis to have sapped the vitality of Flexner
v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 250 (1919). See Overton,
Broadening the Bases of Individual in Personam Jurisdictionin Tennessee, 22
TENN.L. REV. 237 (1952); Note, 4 VAND. L. REv. 661 (1951).
10. See the discussion of the principal case in the Trial section, subsection
on Jurisdiction over Person, of the article on Procedure and Evidence appearing in this Survey. Cf. Knox Bros. v. E. W. Wagner & Co., 141 Tenn. 348, 209
S.W. 638 (1919).
11. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154,
90 L. Ed. 95 (1945); Note, 4 VAND. L. REV. 661, 672 (1951); cf. 6 VAND. L. REV.
947 (1953).
12. But cf. Powers v. Journeymen Bricklayers' Union, 130 Tenn. 643, 172
S.W. 284 (1914). See Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation, 51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941).
13. Gill v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 272 Ky. 328,
114 S.W.2d 123 (1938); United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America
v. Stephens Broadcasting Co., 214 La. 928, 39 So.2d 422 (1949); Mayer v.
Journeymen Stone-cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (Ch. 1890). See
Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV.
933 (1930).
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pects.14 This reflects a conviction that under present conditions
such affairs have become a matter of public concern and, particularly, that internal union democracy and proper standards of financial administration cannot be left to self-regulation alone. 15 One
indirect approach to the problem is the filing requirements set forth
in sections 9 (f), (g) and (h) of the National Labor Relations Act.'0
Publicity for such matters as internal election procedures and financial reports is a condition precedent to use of the machinery of the
National Labor Relations Board for the purpose of seeking certification as a collective bargaining representative or of filing an unfair
labor practice charge. Some state statutes deal directly with such
matters as discipline, 17 finances 18 and elections. 19
The standing of an individual union member, in the absence of
statute, to take direct action in court to secure honesty in the finances
and elections of his local union was treated by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee in Wilson v. Miller.20 The Court, in an opinion by Judge
Burnett, affirmed the action of the chancellor in overruling a demurrer
to the plaintiff's bill. The bill was brought by an individual member
of Local Union 369 of the International Union of Operating Engineers
for himself and others similarly situated against the officers of the local
and the local. It sought an accounting and restitution of union funds
allegedly defalcated and court supervision of an election of union officers. The union constitution and by-laws contained what the Court
described as an orderly procedure for the conduct of the internal affairs of the association, including provisions for financial audits, trial
of disputes and successive appeals within the organizational structure.
A specific provision of the union constitution prohibited court action of
any sort "until and unless all ... provisions for hearing, trial and appeal within the Organization shall have been . .. followed and ex-

hausted .... " It was admitted that the plaintiff had not exhausted all
such provisions. The Court observed that the general rule under such
circumstances is to require the exhaustion of the procedures within the
14. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Crossen v.

Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951); Leo v. Local Union No. 612

of Internat'l Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wash. 2d 498, 174 P.2d 523
(1946); see Aaron and Kamaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-I, 44 ILL. L. REV. 425 (1949); Kovner, The Legal Protection of Civil
Liberties Within Unions, [1948] WIs. L. REv. 18; Summers, Legal Limitations
on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951); cf. Forkosch, Internal Affairs
of Unions: Government Control or Self-Regulation? 18 U. or CHI. L. REv.
729 (1951).

15. See Note, The Power of Trade Unions to Discipline Their Members, 96
U. OF PA. L. REV. 537 (1948), and opinions and articles cited in note 14 supra.
16. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), as amended, 65 STAT. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.A. §§
159(f), (g) and (h) (Supp. 1952).
17. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154a, § 10 (1947).
18. MiN. STAT. AN. § 179.21 (West 1946).
19. MiN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.19-179.20 (West 1946). See generally, Note, 160
A.L.R. 890 (1946).
20. 250 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. 1952).
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association before resorting to the courts,21 the member in effect contracting to do this when he joins, but that this rule does not apply if
the attempt at such exhaustion would be "futile, illusory or vain."
The bill in this instance alleged acts indicating bad faith, fraud and
arbitrary and oppressive action on the part of defendant union officers.
Since the case arose on demurrer to the bill rather than on answer and
proof, the facts averred were taken to be true, and the Court concluded
that, if they were established, it would be futile and vain for the plaintiff to pursue his internal remedies. As to the election of officers, the
opinion stated that such matters "would normally and should be exhausted within the association but since these things are secondary to
the relief sought... it seems to us that the court of Chancery should
likewise take jurisdiction of these matters."22 The standing of the
plaintiff to sue for himself and others similarly situated was comparable, the Court concluded, to a stockholders' derivative suit. The decision in this case is in line with an increasing number of holdings
which, though proceeding on differing legal theories, permit action to
protect the individual union member in connection with a relationship
which in many industrial areas has become a normal concomitant of
23
employment.
RAILWAY LABOR SUITS ix

STATE CoURTS

The standing of employees covered by the Railway Labor Act 24 to
enforce their rights under collective bargaining agreements in the
state courts was treated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Broome
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.2

This has proved to be a problem of

considerable difficulty in recent years.26 Much of the difficulty can be
traced to certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
which have been considered in some respects to be contradictory. In
Moore v. Illinois Central R.R.,2 7 that Court held in 1941 that an individual union member, without exhausting the machinery provided
21. Citing Barthell v. Zachman, 162 Tenn. 336, 36 S.W.2d 886 (1931).
22. 250 S.W.2d at 578.
23. Local 720, International Hod Carriers, etc. v. Bednasek, 119 Colo. 586,
205 P.2d 796 (1949); Collins v. International Alliance, etc., 119 N.J. Eq. 230,
182 Atl. 37 (Ch. 1935); Local No. 11 of International Ass'n, etc. v. McKee, 114
N.J. Eq. 555, 169 Atl. 351 (Ch. 1933) ; Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d
882 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See generally, Perkins, Protectionof Labor Union Funds,
etc., 27 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1947); Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights,
49 McH.L.REV.805 (1951).

24. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended,45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq. (1943).
25. 250 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn.1952).

26. See DAis, ADMniSTRATiVE LAw 670 (1951). Compare Transcontinental
& Western Air, Inc. v.Koppal, 73 Sup. Ct. 906 (U.S. 1953) (discussed infra),
with Broome v.Louisville & N.R.R., 250 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn.1952), and Central
of Georgia Ry.v.Culpepper,32 LABOR RELATIONs REFERENCE MANUAL 2142 (Ga.
May 11, 1953). Inthe latter case, the Supreme Court of Georgia reached a decision contrary to that of the Tennessee Court in the Broome case on substantially similar facts.
27. 312 U.S. 630, 61 Sup. Ct. 754, 85 L. Ed. 1089 (1941).
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under the Railway Labor Act, could bring suit in a state court for damages for his discharge by the defendant railroad contrary to the terms
of a contract between the company and the union. The permissive
language of the 1934 amendment to the Act regarding referral of disputes to the Adjustment Board 28 was taken to negative any idea of
compulsion in the use of the settlement mechanism provided in the
Act. Subsequently, in Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western
R.R., 29 the United States Supreme Court held that a state court did not
have jurisdiction to hear an action by a railroad against two unions
representing certain of its employees in which the employer sought
an interpretation and declaration of rights under an existing contract.
It was considered that the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board under
the Railway Labor Act was exclusive over disputes of this character
and that no court - state or federal - could invade this jurisdiction.
The Moore case was distinguished - and decidedly limited - as involving a common law or statutory action for wrongful discharge differing from any remedy which the Adjustment Board could provide,
which did not "involve questions of future relations between the railroads and its other employees." One writer has stated: "The small
portion of the Moore Case that is left standing seems to be ripe for
overruling, in order logically to round out the primary jurisdiction
of the NRAB. '' 30 Instead, the Supreme Court of the United States has
in certain respects re-enforced the doctrine of the Moore (as-modifiedin-Slocum) case. On June 1, 1953, in the case of Transcontinental &
Western Air,.Inc. v. Koppal,31 it announced:
"The result is that, whereas, under the Railway Labor Act, the Adjustment
Board has exclusive jurisdiction to adjust grievances and jurisdictional
disputes of the type involved in the Slocum Case, that Board does not
have like exclusive jurisdiction over the claim of an employee that he has
been unlawfully discharged. Such employee may proceed either in accordance with the administrative procedures prescribed in his employment
contract or he may resort to his action at law for alleged unlawful discharge if the state courts recognize such a claim." 32
The opinion added, however, that the law of a state may or may not
require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to entertaining
a proceeding of the type that falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Adjustment Board and that a federal court in a diversity proceeding would be guided accordingly. In the Koppal case it was found
that the plaintiff could bring his action for wrongful discharge against
the defendant carrier in the United States District Court for the
28. 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C.A. § 153 (i) (1943).
29. 339 U.S. 239, 70 Sup. Ct. 577, 94 L. Ed. 795 (1950).
30. DAVIS,

ADMINSTRATVE LAW

31. 73 Sup. Ct. 906 (U.S. 1953).
32. 73 Sup. Ct. at 910.

672 (1951).
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Western District of Missouri, but that that court properly applied
Missouri law requiring an exhaustion of administrative remedies under the plaintiff's employment contract in dismissing the complaint.
The practical effect of this would seem to be to place a further limitation on the doctrine of the Moore case but, within its limited sphere,
33
to put at rest questions as to its continued validity.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Broome v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.34 felt that the facts fell within the doctrine of the Slocum
case and that thus there was no jurisdiction in a state court to hear
the complaint. In the Broome case, certain individual members of the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen filed their bill in
the Chancery Court of Knox County to establish their rights under a
collective bargaining contract between the union and the defendant
railroad. The bill asserted a wrongful discharge as a result of a conspiracy between the carrier and the union and prayed specific performance of the contract, reinstatement and judgment for back wages
lost. The opinion by Judge Gailor affirmed the dismissal of the bill,
reasoning that the instant case was quite different from the Moore case,
since the relief sought would affect not only past relations but also the
future status of the complainants and other employees with the union
and the railroad. It was concluded that, since the state court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the bill, it had no jurisdiction to make a declaration concerning the necessity of exhausting administrative remedies
before bringing the bill. It will be noted that, while the facts in this
case fall somewhat in between the Moore and Slocum situations, the
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court is quite in keeping with the
latest restatement of the rule in Transcontinental& Western Air, Inc.
v. Koppal.35
The Broome opinion spoke of the situation as being an illustration
of Congress "occupying the field" with a federal regulation. The case
made clear, however, that in this instance the federal occupancy has
resulted in placing "primary jurisdiction" with respect to the determination in the first instance of certain types of disputes exclusively
in the National Railroad Adjustment Board. Whether Congress intended to put .exclusive jurisdiction in an agency is a problem of
statutory construction for the courts in interpreting the statute creating the agency.36 Congress may "occupy the field" in a certain area of
33. See note 30 supra.
34. 250 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. 1952).

35. 73 Sup. Ct. 906 (U.S. 1953).

36. An intent to confer such "primary jurisdiction" may be inferred from
factors such as an assumed need for the experience of specialists and for uniformity in regulation. See Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70
Sup. Ct. 577, 94 L. Ed. 795 (1950); Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator
Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943 (1922); cf. Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553 (1907). See
Note, 94 L. Ed. 806 (1950); [1950] U. oF ILL. L.F. 460. Garrison, The National
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regulation without providing for such exclusive jurisdiction in an
agency.3 For example, the National Labor Relations Act has no provision at all for processing disputes comparable to those referred to
the Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act.
OVERTIE COMPENSATION

In Todd v. Roane-Anderson Company,3 the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, applied the regulations of the Wage-Hour
Administrator, U.S. Department of Labor, and the Portal-to-Portal Act
of 194739 in affirming a judgment for the defendant-employer, a costplus contractor with the United States, in a suit for overtime compensation. The plaintiff-employee's claim was based on employment
during World War II at Oak Ridge on the Roane-Anderson pay roll in
a supervisory classification at a straight hourly rate. His claim apparently rested on three theories: (a) oral contract, (b) the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 40 and (c) the overtime
provisions of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act.41 First, the
Court found that the evidence did not preponderate in favor of the alleged oral contract, relying particularly on an assumed illegality under
prevailing wage stabilization policies of a promise to pay time and onehalf for hours in excess of 40 per week. Second, the claim under the
Fair Labor Standards Act was disposed of by the Court's conclusion
that the evidence did not show that plaintiff engaged in as much as
20 percent manual work of the character he was allegedly supervising.
Hence, in accordance with its understanding of the administrative
regulations defining an "executive," the Court of Appeals did not interfere with the finding of the court below that the plaintiff was exempt as an executive under Section 13(a) (1) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.42 In any event, the Court concluded, the claim would
RailroadAdjustment Board:A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567
(1937), indicates the work of that agency.
37. Under § 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 382 (1887), 49
U.S.C.A. § 9 (1929), there is provision for concurrent jurisdiction over the recovery of damages in the courts and in the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Alternative routes for the relief of the federal taxpayer are provided in the
federal district courts and the Tax Court. Compare 62 STAT. 932 (1948), 28

U.S.C.A. § 1340 (1950), with 53 STAT. 82 (1939), as amended, 56 STAT. 876
(1942), 26 U.S.C.A. § 272(a) (1) (1945).
38. 251 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. 1952).
39. 61 STAT. 84 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-62 (Supp. 1952). See Interpretative
Bulletin, 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 790 (1949).
40. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), as amended, 63 STAT. 910 (1949), 29 U.S.C.A. §§
201-19 (1947, Supp. 1952).

41. 49 STAT. 2036 (1936), as amended, 66 STAT. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C.A. §§
35-45 (1952, Supp. 1952).
42. 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended, 53 STAT. 1266 (1939), 29 U.S.C.A. §
213 (a) (1) (1947). For the current regulations defining an executive employee
for purposes of this exemption, see 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.1 (1949) and the

Wage-Hour Administrator's Explanatory Bulletin, 29 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 541.99541.119 (1949). The Court's understanding in this case does not appear to be
consistent with the Administrator's interpretation, since one of the necessary
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have been barred by the Portal-to-Portal Act's provision for good faith
reliance on administrative approval by a federal agency.4 3 Third,

the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act" was found to be inapplicable
because no provision exists under that Act for private enforcement of
claims. It may be observed that the case is of little general importance,
since it turned primarily on the evidence adduced and legal questions
which in many respects are strictly limited to the particular time, place
and circumstances.
VACATION BENFITs

Repercussions of a 1946 coal strike came before the Tennessee Court
of Appeals, Middle Section, in Turner v. Tennessee Products& Chemical Corp.45 As of March 31, 1946, the United Mine Workers, per John
L. Lewis, President, terminated the bituminous contract dated April 1,
1945, pursuant to a power reserved in that agreement. This resulted
in a work stoppage at mines covered by the agreement, including the
Whitwell mine of the Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation.
Seizure of the struck mines by the Federal Government was followed
on May 29, 1946, by an agreement between Secretary of Interior Krug,
acting as Coal Mines Administrator, and John L. Lewis, covering conditions of employment during government operation. This included a
provision that "all employees with a record of one year's standing
(June 1, 1945 to May 31, 1946) shall receive as compensation for the
... vacation period the sum of $100 ....

Pro rata payments for the

months they are on the pay roll shall be provided for those mine
workers who are given employment during the qualifying period and
those who leave their employment." 4 Although agreeing to operate
another mine under the Krug-Lewis agreement, the Tennessee Products and Chemical Corporation on June 1, 1946, notified the Coal Mines
Administrator that it was discontinuing operations at the Whitwell
mine because of financial losses. It was in turn notified by ViceAdmiral Moreel, Deputy Coal Mines Administrator, that his office "interposes no objections at this time" to the discontinuance, since mine
operations under the seizure were for the account of the company and at
its risk.47 The plaintiffs in the case coming before the Tennessee Court
requirements for the executive exemption is payment on a salary basis which
is not subject to reduction because of variation in hours worked. 29 CODE FED.
REGS. § 541.118 (1949). See Walling v. Morris, 155 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1946);
Walling v. Yeakley, 140 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1944).
43. 61 STAT. 88 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 258 (Supp. 1952). See 29 CODE FED.
REcs. §§ 790.13-790.19 (1949).

44. See note 41 supra.

45. 251 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1952).

46. 251 S.W.2d at 443.

47. But cf. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 71 Sup. Ct. 670,
95 L. Ed. 809 (1951), and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Vinson in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667, 72 Sup. Ct. 863,
96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).

For court decision related to the 1946 coal-mine seizure, see United States v
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of Appeals were employed at the Whitwell mine. They had'quit work'
when the 1945 contract was terminated in March. They did not thereafter perform work for Tennessee Products at Whitwell or elsewhere,
although some similarly situated employees did work at another mine
of the Company and received the vacation benefits provided by the
Krug-Lewis agreement quoted above. Each plaintiff's claim was for
the $100 vacation benefits.
In an opinion by Judge Felts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court in granting the company's motion for a directed verdict. There was no evidence from which it could be found
that the Krug-Lewis agreement was applicable to plaintiffs' employment, since they had severed the employment relationship in March
and the agreement in question was not accepted by the company with
respect to the Whitwell mine. In fact the opinion stated, the contract
in question was never accepted by or made applicable to either party
to the suit. The Court accepted the evidence of the company that the
plaintiffs were never on its pay roll after March 31, 1946. Because of
plaintiffs' failure to comply with a court rule, the Court did not find it
necessary to consider whether the company had treated the plaintiffs
as its employees after the above date for purposes of preventing their
receiving unemployment compensation benefits. These workers had
been drawing vacation benefits in previous years, and they were entitled thereto under the 1945 agreement. Obviously, such benefits are
a considerable aspect of the value of total compensation received for
the job. 48 Hence, a denial to these workers of even pro rata benefits
has elements of harshness. Technically, however, their difficulty is
traceable directly to the termination of the 1945 agreement in March,
1946. While it may be assumed that the Mine Workers' president took
that move in the expectation of gaining economic benefits for coal
miners generally, it necessarily suspended such benefits as were tied
to the contract. The Court concluded here that nothing ever replaced
that contract insofar as the plaintiffs were concerned. It placed particular reliance upon the fact that the plaintiffs had ceased to be employees when the contract was terminated and the strike began on
March 31, 1946.
The above reasoning suggests certain questions. A strike normally
does not terminate the employment relationship. 49 Persons normally
employed whose work has ceased in connection with a current labor
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947);
Krug v. Fox, 161 F.2d 1013 (4th Cir. 1947); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
United Mine Workers, 159 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
48. See In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); Division
of Labor Law Enforcement v. Ryan Aeronautical Co., 106 Cal. App.2d 833;
236 P.2d 236 (1951); Textile Workers Union of America v. Paris Fabric Mills,
Inc., 18 N.J. Super. 421, 87 A.2d 458 (County Ct. 1952).
49. See definition of "employee" in section 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (Supp. 1952).

4953:]

LABOR LAW

1203

dispute are disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation 5 0
They are considered to be attached to the labor force of the particular
employer rather than available for work in the general labor market.5 '
Hence, it would seem important in a case such as this to have a very
complete development of the facts to show whether or not it could be
said that a current labor dispute continued to exist at the Whitwell
mine, beyond the date of the Krug-Lewis agreement. A decision to
cease operations prior to that date, for example, would have been important in showing that such a current labor dispute no longer
existed. If the company took steps to defeat unemployment compensation on the ground of the continuation of a current labor dispute,
that would suggest it had not decided to cease operations and was
treating the plaintiffs as its striking employees. The Whitwell mine
was included among those seized under Government order. 52 It has
beenheld that such a seizure constitutes a "taking" of private property
for which, in the event of loss, compensation must be made by the
Federal. Government pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 3 If the Whitwell mine could be considered, in light of a full development of all
pertinent facts, to be a "going concern" through May 29, 1946, then it
would appear that plaintiffs should have received at least their pro rata
vacation benefits, and any losses chargeable thereto should have been
recovered by the company from the United States. 54 A release of a
mine from governmental seizure because it is not a "going concern"
should, of course, constitute relief from all subsequent obligations,
contractual or otherwise, associated with operation. These coniments
are-not meant to suggest that the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts in this case were improper on the merits. They are intended to
reflect the opinion, however, that facts which would seem to be important in determining the question were not developed -or at least
were not stated in the opinion.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS - 195355
During the 1953 session of the Tennessee General Assembly, principal interest in terms of Labor Law centered on efforts to legalize the
5D. -TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.29 (Williams Supp. 1952); see Mlne Chair Co. v.
Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950); Block Coal & Coke Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 177 Tenn. 247, 148 S.W.2d 364, 149 S.W.2d 469 (1941).
51. See Leser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE

L.J. 167, 177 (1945); cf. Freeman, Availability: Active Search for Work, 10
OHIo ST. L.J. 181 (1949).
52. See cases cited in note 47 supra.
53. United States v. Pewee Coal Co. 341 U.S. 114, 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 95 L. Ed.
809 (1951).

54. Ibid.; see dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Vinson in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667, 72 Sup. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153
(1952).

55. The writer would like to acknowledge the assistance of Charles K. Cos-

ner, Assistant Chief Counsel of the Tennessee Department of Employment

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1204

[ VOL. 6

union shop.5 6 Under the existing law of the State, it is unlawful to
deny employment, existing or prospective, by reason of union membership, nonmembership or the nonpayment of union dues. 5 7 The proposed bill to legalize collective bargaining contracts which, in general,
would require union membership as a condition of continuing employment was killed, although it carried the label of an "administration"
measure. Likewise, a so-called "full-crew" bill regarding the number
of employees on railroad trains was defeated.
Bills were passed and signed by the Governor which would (a) require payment of prevailing wages to workers on state-financed construction projects, 8 (b) increase to 54 the maximum hours per week
permitted for female telephone workers5 9 and (c) amend the Employment Security Law in several respects.60 The amendments to the
statute governing the payment of unemployment compensation benefits changed the definition of wages to exclude "tips," except where the
employee has accounted for them to the employer,61 and increased
maximum weekly benefits from $22 to $26.62 Qualifying wages in the
base period, necessary to receive benefits, were raised, however, which
should have the effect of offsetting to a considerable degree any increased cost due to higher weekly benefits. Another change would, in
effect, cancel entirely the wage credits of an employee discharged for
"gross misconduct" prior to the disqualifying act.63 Appeal periods in
benefit cases were cut from fifteen to ten days, 64 a penalty tax rate
was provided for employers reflecting a "deficit" in terms of contributions and benefits paid out 65 and the limitation period on refunds of
66
contributions erroneously paid was increased from one to four years.
Security, in furnishing information upon which the aspects of this summary
related to unemployment compensation are based. Mr. Cosner is not responsible
for any expression of opinion contained herein.
56. The National Labor Relations Act invalidates, within its coverage, a
contract requiring union membership as a condition of hiring - i.e., a closed
shop. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), as amended, 65 STAT. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.A. §
158(a) (3) (Supp. 1952). A proviso to this same section of the Act permits the
operation of a contract making union membership, under certain limitation,
a condition of remaining in employment -i.e., a union shop. The power of
state law to restrict this proviso is specifically provided. 61 STAT. 151 (1947),
29 U.S.C.A. § 164(b) (Supp. 1952).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11412.8, 11412.10. (Williams Supp. 1952).
58. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 168. This act apparently contemplates utilization
of the wage determinations made under the Davis-Bacon Act, 46 STAT. 1494
(1935), as amended, 49 STAT. 1011 (1940), 40 U.S.C.A. § 276a (1952), for
federal construction projects.
59. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 242.
60. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 244.
61. Id. § 1.
62. Id. § 2.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 3.
§ 4.
§ 5.
§ 6.
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In another bill, 67 there was clarification of the authority of the Commissioner of Employment Security to pay unemployment benefits to
Korean war veterans as contemplated under the Federal Veteran's
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952.6
67. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1953, c. 173.
68. 66 STAT. 663 (1952), 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 et seq. (Supp. 1952).

